New Life for the Octopus: How Voting Rules Sustain the Power of California's Big Landowners
| Autor: | Mason Gaffney, Merrill Goodall |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Sociology and Political Science media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Control (management) Opposition (politics) Power (social and political) State (polity) Economy Political economy Voting 0502 economics and business Agency (sociology) Economics Liberian dollar 050202 agricultural economics & policy 050207 economics Rural area media_common |
| Zdroj: | American Journal of Economics and Sociology. 75:649-680 |
| ISSN: | 0002-9246 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/ajes.12152 |
| Popis: | The concentrated ownership of farmland has influenced rural life in the state of California for more than a century. Reformers have introduced measures to counteract that concentration, such as acreage limits on farms receiving water from federally funded projects. Large landowners have fought back with policies that have protected their ability to amass and maintain their empires. In the first part of this article, Mason Gaffney presents this historical background in broad outlines. In the second part, Merrill Goodall explains an important policy that preserves the power of entrenched interests: water districts that are governed by a board elected by a voting system that allots one vote to each dollar of land value. In these districts, a tiny handful of landowners is able to control a public agency without opposition and without the need to persuade other voters. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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