Inter-domain pricing: challenges and possible approaches
| Autor: | Bruno Tuffin, Hoang-Hai Tran |
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| Rok vydání: | 2010 |
| Předmět: |
Scheme (programming language)
Interconnection Computer Networks and Communications Inter-domain Computer science TheoryofComputation_GENERAL 020206 networking & telecommunications Context (language use) 02 engineering and technology Computer security computer.software_genre Computer Science Applications Incentive Risk analysis (engineering) 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Resource allocation 020201 artificial intelligence & image processing computer computer.programming_language |
| Zdroj: | International Journal of Network Management. 21:223-246 |
| ISSN: | 1055-7148 |
| DOI: | 10.1002/nem.760 |
| Popis: | Telecommunication networks are now an interconnection of competitive operators that need to cooperate to ensure end-to-end delivery of traffic. Inter-domain agreements have to be performed, and pricing is seen as a relevant way to provide an incentive to intermediate domains for forwarding the traffic of others. In this paper, we first review propositions from the literature. Greatest consideration is given to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction because it provides appropriate incentives, leads to an efficient use of the network and satisfies other relevant properties. We highlight, on the other hand, that it is neither budgetbalanced nor robust to collusion--something forgotten in the inter-domain context. This brings us to review the list of properties that we would ideally like the inter-domain pricing scheme to satisfy, and claim that no mechanism can satisfy all of them together. We then adapt to inter-domain other resource allocation and pricing schemes, and discuss which properties are or should be relaxed. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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