Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining

Autor:	T. Clifton Morgan, Valentin L. Krustev
Rok vydání:	2011
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics media_common.quotation_subject Coercion Economic sanctions Politics Bargaining power Market economy State (polity) Political economy Political Science and International Relations Economics Sanctions Relevance (law) Communication source media_common
Zdroj:	Conflict Management and Peace Science. 28:351-376
ISSN:	1549-9219 0738-8942
Popis:	Research on when economic sanctions end has emphasized either the international bargaining game played by the sender and the target or the redistributive politics and ruling coalition changes in each state. We contend that neither approach offers a fully satisfactory explanation for economic coercion termination. Bargaining is inconsistent with long coercion episodes while ruling coalition changes cannot inform our understanding of very short episodes. We argue that both bargaining factors and domestic realignments matter, but the influence of bargaining factors declines as a sanctions episode continues while the relevance of domestic realignments increases over time. Our empirical tests, which utilize the new Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions data set, provide support for both the bargaining and domestic realignment approaches, suggesting that unifying them is beneficial.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::07e8bbae7eec1fcd09449e9332f40175 https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894211413057 Zobrazit plný text záznamu