The Labor Market for Directors and Externalities in Corporate Governance

Autor:	Nadya Malenko, Doron Levit
Rok vydání:	2016
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics 050208 finance ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSION Transparency (market) business.industry media_common.quotation_subject Corporate governance 05 social sciences Enterprise value ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING Accounting Affect (psychology) Independence Complementarity (molecular biology) 0502 economics and business Business 050207 economics ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS Finance Externality media_common Reputation
Zdroj:	The Journal of Finance. 71:775-808
ISSN:	0022-1082
Popis:	This paper studies how directors' reputational concerns affect board structure, corporate governance, and firm value. In our setting, directors affect their firms' governance, and governance in turn affects firms' demand for new directors. Whether the labor market rewards a shareholder-friendly or management-friendly reputation is determined in equilibrium and depends on aggregate governance. We show that directors' desire to be invited to other boards creates strategic complementarity of corporate governance across firms. Directors' reputational concerns amplify the governance system: strong systems become stronger and weak systems become weaker. We derive implications for multiple directorships, board size, transparency, and board independence.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::070c7c6d52a02aa939366ccf1e648d3e https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12287 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
Nepřihlášeným uživatelům se plný text nezobrazuje	K zobrazení výsledku je třeba se přihlásit.