How Should your Beliefs Change When your Awareness Grows?
| Autor: | Richard Pettigrew |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Episteme. :1-25 |
| ISSN: | 1750-0117 1742-3600 |
| DOI: | 10.1017/epi.2022.33 |
| Popis: | Epistemologists who study credences have a well-developed account of how you should change them when you learn new evidence; that is, when your body of evidence grows. What's more, they boast a diverse range of epistemic and pragmatic arguments that support that account. But they do not have a satisfactory account of when and how you should change your credences when you become aware of possibilities and propositions you have not entertained before; that is, when your awareness grows. In this paper, I consider the arguments for the credal epistemologist's account of how to respond to evidence, and I ask whether they can help us generate an account of how to respond to awareness growth. The results are surprising: the arguments that all support the same norms for responding to evidence growth support a number of different norms when they are applied to awareness growth. Some of these norms seem too weak, others too strong. I ask what we should conclude from this, and argue that our credal response to awareness growth is considerably less rigorously constrained than our credal response to new evidence. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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