Tacit Assumptions and Fallacious Principles: Testing Atlantic Solidarity at the United Nations

Autor: Ioannis D. Stefanidis
Rok vydání: 2002
Předmět:
Zdroj: Journal of Contemporary History. 37:241-258
ISSN: 1461-7250
0022-0094
DOI: 10.1177/00220094020370020501
Popis: The election of the non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council may at first sight seem a routine matter, hardly a cause for putting relations between allied powers to the test. Article 23 of the Charter defines two criteria which may qualify candidates to the supreme executive organ: 'The contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organisation'; and the need to maintain 'equitable geographical distribution'. In addition to these general principles, a third factor played an important role, at least intermittently, over a long period: the distribution of influence among various blocs of member states. This arrangement, clearly reflected in the early postwar elections for non-permanent seats, was founded on a 'gentleman's agreement' allegedly reached in London on the eve of the First General Assembly, in January 1946. According to diplomats and scholars alike, the permanent members of the Security Council had agreed among themselves a specific pattern of geographical distribution. The apparent aim was to secure the election of friendly states from regions that essentially coincided with existing spheres of influence: Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, the British Commonwealth, Latin America and Western Europe. The sixth non-permanent seat could go to a 'residual' constituency such as the Arab League.1 If applied in successive elections, this pattern of seat allocation could all but eliminate the chances of several states ever to serve a term on the Security Council. The situation would be further compounded due to the predictable influx of new members. In this respect, Greece is a fairly typical example. The country, despite its membership of western institutions, was generally regarded as a non-caucus state and managed to get elected to the Security Council only once. This happened in 1951 and occasioned a veritable diplomatic melee between the USA and its major European allies, particularly Britain, at the height of the Cold War. The dispute was fuelled by conflicting interpretations of the aforementioned 'gentleman's agreement'. It is an episode which reveals something about the limits of the Anglo-American 'special relationship' and
Databáze: OpenAIRE