Public Spending and the Paradox of Supermajority Rule

Autor:	Dongwon Lee, Thomas E. Borcherding, Youngho Kang
Rok vydání:	2014
Předmět:	Government spending Economics and Econometrics Politics Tax revenue Public spending Government State (polity) Public economics media_common.quotation_subject Economics Supermajority Legislature media_common
Zdroj:	Southern Economic Journal. 80:614-632
ISSN:	0038-4038
DOI:	10.4284/0038-4038-2012.205
Popis:	This article examines the paradox that a supermajority rule in a legislature promotes excessive government spending. We propose a simple conjecture: If rent-seeking coalitions dominate legislative politics and if individual legislators' demands for rent-seeking activities are price-inelastic, a change of legislative rules from simple majority to a supermajority will lead to greater public spending, other things equal. Using data from U.S. state legislatures, 1970 to 2007, we find that the adoption of a supermajority rule has a robust, positive impact on various types of tax revenues and government expenditures.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::03e8f440727a302a3691ac80709147fe https://doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-2012.205 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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