COUNTERACTING SHILL BIDDING IN ONLINE ENGLISH AUCTION
| Autor: | Yuhui Zhong, Bharat Bhargava, Mamata Jenamani |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2005 |
| Předmět: |
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS
Proxy bid Auction theory Computer science TheoryofComputation_GENERAL Computer Science Applications Revenue equivalence Reverse auction Microeconomics Multiunit auction Auction sniping Vickrey auction ComputingMilieux_COMPUTERSANDSOCIETY English auction Information Systems |
| Zdroj: | International Journal of Cooperative Information Systems. 14:245-263 |
| ISSN: | 1793-6365 0218-8430 |
| Popis: | The popularity of online auctions and the associated frauds have led to many auction sites preferring English auction over other auction mechanisms. The ease of adopting multiple fake identities over the Internet nourishes shill bidding by fraudulent sellers in English auction. In this paper, we derive an equilibrium bidding strategy to counteract shill bidding in an online English auction. An algorithm based on this strategy is developed. We conduct experiments to evaluate the strategy in a simulated eBay like auction environment. Five popular bidding strategies are compared with the proposed one. In the simulation, bidders compete to buy a product in the presence of a shill. Each bidder is randomly assigned a bidding strategy. She draws her valuation from a uniform distribution. The experiments show hat the average expected utility of agents with proposed strategy is the highest when the auction continues for a longer duration. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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