| Popis: |
By creating an artificial output path for the central nervous system, Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) enable users to affect the world without engaging their bodies’ peripheral muscular and nervous systems. The action-theoretical as well as normative implications of this novel way of acting have recently gained attention in philosophical discourse. What, if anything, are the differences between ordinary bodily actions and actions mediated by machines or computers? And what are the normative implications that result from these differences? We argue for a new focus in addressing these questions by highlighting an action-theoretical aspect that has been neglected so far: the acquisition of skill in acting with BCIs. By drawing on empirical literature, we show that skilled BCI users are able to perform actions with their devices without performing a mental act. This results in an action-theoretical analysis of BCI actions according to which users are able to perform BCI actions as basic actions. We then discuss some normative implications of our findings, especially for the applicability of the legal concept of actions to actions performed using BCIs. |
