Mechanism Design with Moderate Evidence Cost

Autor:	Jesse Bull
Rok vydání:	2008
Předmět:	Class (computer programming) Mechanism design Mathematical optimization Mechanism (biology) restrict Complete information Moderate evidence Economics Production (economics) Transferable utility General Economics Econometrics and Finance Mathematical economics
Zdroj:	The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 8
ISSN:	1935-1704 2194-6124
Popis:	This paper addresses how a moderate evidence disclosure cost can be incorporated into mechanism-design analysis. The paper shows that in public-action settings with transferable utility one can restrict attention to a class of three-stage dynamic mechanisms. Under complete information with two or more players, a version of this type of mechanism can be used to eliminate evidence production in equilibrium. The paper also provides conditions on the evidence environment under which the class of mechanisms studied in Bull and Watson (2004) is equivalent to those considered here.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::01c02badc367041a6bc875301aecb5bc https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1446 Zobrazit plný text záznamu