Rule Evolution and Equilibrium Selection

Autor:	Wei-Torng Juang
Rok vydání:	2002
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics Equilibrium selection Best response media_common.quotation_subject Mutation (genetic algorithm) Economics Imitation Mathematical economics Frequency Finance Selection (genetic algorithm) media_common
Zdroj:	Games and Economic Behavior. 39:71-90
ISSN:	0899-8256
DOI:	10.1006/game.2001.0894
Popis:	This paper studies rule evolution and its effect on selection between strict equilibria. Two rules are investigated; the myopic best response and naive imitation. If agents cannot change rules, equilibrium selection is determined by the relative frequency of agents using the two rules. When agents can only change rules through mutation, the efficient equilibrium weakly dominates the risk-dominant one. If agents can change rules by updating, then the efficient equilibrium strictly dominates the risk-dominant one. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D81.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0191ff190e7920c72a3236791e67519e https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0894 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full Text from ScienceDirect