Corporate Investment and Changes in CEO Stock Option Grants
| Autor: | Vasiliki E. Athanasakou, Daniel Ferreira, Lisa Goh |
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| Rok vydání: | 2013 |
| Předmět: |
History
Actuarial science Executive compensation Polymers and Plastics Financial economics Non-qualified stock option Stock options ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING Restricted stock Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering Earnings management Value (economics) Business Business and International Management |
| Zdroj: | SSRN Electronic Journal. |
| ISSN: | 1556-5068 |
| DOI: | 10.2139/ssrn.2260414 |
| Popis: | We study changes in CEO stock option grants. Unlike most of the literature, we focus on the number rather than the value of options granted. We first provide a detailed description of the main aggregate trends in CEO stock option grants. We then consider the cross-sectional heterogeneity in option-granting activity. We find that CEOs who either overinvest or underinvest subsequently receive fewer stock options as part of their compensation packages. CEOs who hold exercisable deeply-in-the-money options (overconfident CEOs) also receive fewer stock options in subsequent periods. Our findings provide insights into the dynamics of CEO compensation contracts. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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