On the separation of executive and legislative powers: Executive independence, liberty, and social welfare

Autor:	Justin Fox, Mattias K. Polborn
Rok vydání:	2021
Předmět:	Sociology and Political Science Political science media_common.quotation_subject Separation (statistics) Separation of powers Legislature Social Welfare Norm (social) Enforcement Independence Law and economics media_common
Zdroj:	Journal of Theoretical Politics. 33:430-454
ISSN:	1460-3667 0951-6298
DOI:	10.1177/09516298211043234
Popis:	We explore the effects of a particular facet of separation of powers—namely, the executive’s independence from the legislature—on maintaining a norm of legislative restraint in which antagonistic factions refrain from passing laws that infringe on their rival’s liberties. Our main result establishes that executive independence may sometimes undermine and at other times facilitate legislative restraint, depending on the probabilities with which the factions hold legislative and executive power. Our results contribute to the larger game-theoretic literature exploring the effects of political institutions; our results also contribute to the literature exploring how institutions designed to protect liberty affect tacit cooperation among rival factions.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::008a2c8360635cc1257842807d6d0d8c https://doi.org/10.1177/09516298211043234 Zobrazit plný text záznamu