Farsighted house allocation
| Autor: | Klaus, Bettina, Klijn, Flip, Walzl, Markus, Harvard Business School |
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| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Recercat: Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya instname Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Popis: | Altres ajuts: VIDI-452-06-013 Altres ajuts: CONSOLIDER-INGENIO/CSD2006-00016 In this note we study von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for Shapley and Scarf (1974) housing markets. Kawasaki (2008) shows that the set of competitive allocations coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of antisymmetric weak dominance (cf., Wako, 1999). We demonstrate that the set of competitive allocations also coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of strong dominance (cf., Roth and Postlewaite, 1977) if no individual is indifferent between his endowment and the endowment of someone else. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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