Los retos del gobierno corporativo de las sociedades controladas
| Autor: | Gutiérrez, María, Sáez Lacave, María Isabel |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | Spanish; Castilian |
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Sociedad contrtolada
Protección del inversor externo Controlled companies Corporation law Concentración de capital Corporate governance G35 Accionista de control Estructura de propiedad K22 Ownership structure Gobierno corporativo Expropiación de accionistas minoritarios Economía Derecho de sociedades Controlling share-holders Minority expropiation Outside investor protection G32 G34 Ownership concentration Empresa |
| Zdroj: | e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid instname |
| Popis: | En el presente artículo se discuten los retos a los que se enfrenta el gobierno corporativo de las sociedades con socios de control o controladas que cotizan en Bolsa respecto a la protección de los inversores externos. En Europa continental, la mayoría de las sociedades cotizadas presentan una estructura de propiedad concentrada, y como se verá, este tipo de propiedad resulta problemático. Un análisis pormenorizado revela que el gobierno corporativo en estas sociedades choca con importantes problemas de diseño. Se supone que las jurisdicciones europeas atesoran un mayor historial y experiencia a la hora de tratar con estas sociedades, al menos en comparación con la experiencia estadounidense. Sin embargo, nuestro análisis muestra que el gobierno corporativo de estas empresas se ocupa principalmente del problema de agencia «accionistas-administradores», dejando, por tanto, sin resolver el relativo al «accionistas internos-accionistas externos». La conclusión que arroja este estudio es que, pese al esfuerzo regulatorio realizado por los legisladores europeos durante las últimas décadas, los outsiders gozan de menor protección en las sociedades cotizadas europeas con accionistas de control que sus homólogos de EE.UU. In this paper we consider the corporate governance challenges of the protection of outside investors of listed controlled firms. In Europe, most listed firms have concentrated ownership structures. However, this ownership type is problematic. A clinical analysis reveals that the corporate governance in these firms in terms of liability, voice and exit faces important design problems. European jurisdictions are supposed to be more veteran and skilled in dealing with these firms, at least in comparison to the American experience. Nevertheless, our analysis shows that the corporate governance of these firms is mainly aimed at checking the shareholders-manager agency problem leaving the controlling shareholder-minority agency problem unresolved. As this article explains, in spite of the regulatory effort that European jurisdictions have made during the last decades, outside investors in European listed firms with controlling shareholders are poorly protected compared to US investors. In this paper we consider the corporate governance challenges of the protection of outside investors of listed controlled firms. In Europe, most listed firms have concentrated ownership structures. However, this ownership type is problematic. A clinical analysis reveals that the corporate governance in these firms in terms of liability, voice and exit faces important design problems. European jurisdictions are supposed to be more veteran and skilled in dealing with these firms, at least in comparison to the American experience. Nevertheless, our analysis shows that the corporate governance of these firms is mainly aimed at checking the shareholders-manager agency problem leaving the controlling shareholder-minority agency problem unresolved. As this article explains, in spite of the regulatory effort that European jurisdictions have made during the last decades, outside investors in European listed firms with controlling shareholders are poorly protected compared to US investors |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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