Peaceful Agreements to Share a River
| Autor: | Rene van den Brink, Saish Nevrekar |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Economics, Tinbergen Institute |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | van den Brink, R & Nevrekar, S 2020 ' Peaceful Agreements to Share a River ' TI Discussion Paper Series, vol. 20-016/II, II edn, Tinbergen Institute . < https://papers.tinbergen.nl/20016.pdf > Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam |
| Popis: | This paper develops a model of conflict resolution over scarce water in a trans-boundary river. In our model, we consider countries that are located along a river and made a military investment. Given these investments and their location along the river, they sequentially bargain over the surplus of water, or decide to engage in a military conflict with their upstream neighbour. The probability of winning a military conflict is determined by a contest success function which depends on the military investments made before. We speak about a peaceful agreement if the countries rationally decide to bargain over the water instead of engaging into a military conflict. We show that, if all benefit functions are nonnegative, increasing and concave, then for every level of military investment, there always exists a peaceful agreement where every country prefers to bargain peacefully for the water. We provide a scenario that yields one such a peaceful agreement. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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