THE INVISIBLE HAND AND THE BANKING TRADE: SEIGNIORAGE, RISK-SHIFTING, AND MORE

Autor: Miller, Marcus, Zhang, Lei
Rok vydání: 2013
Předmět:
Zdroj: Brussels Economic Review / Cahiers économiques de Bruxelles
Brussels economic review, 56 (3-4
Popis: The classic Diamond-Dybvig model of banking assumes perfect competition and abstracts from issues ofmoral hazard. To reflect conditions prevailing in UK banking, however, we incorporate market powerand risk-taking by banks with limited liability, with explicit analytical results for the case wheredepositors are highly risk averse. We show how the effectiveness of bank franchise value in checkingrisk-taking may be undermined by the prospect of bailouts; and how bail-in provisions are beingdesigned to correct this.
info:eu-repo/semantics/published
Special Issue30th Symposium on Money, Banking and FinanceGuest editors: Christian Aubin, Noëlle Duport andDaniel Goyeau
Databáze: OpenAIRE