Biased managers, organizational design, and incentive provision
| Autor: | Moreira, Humberto Ataíde, Costa, Cristiano Machado, Ferreira, Daniel Bernardo Soares |
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| Přispěvatelé: | Escolas::EPGE, FGV |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2004 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) instacron:FGV |
| Popis: | We model the tradeoff between the balance and the strength of incentives implicit in the choice between hierarchical and matrix organizational structures. We show that managerial biases determine which structure is optimal: hierarchical forms are preferred when biases are low, while matrix structures are preferred when biases are high. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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