| Popis: |
The central theme of this thesis is the action towards "non-human life", i.e. towards the life of "people", who aren't called people in certain circumstances. The author asks, if our responsibility is limited to human beings. The definition of human being is deliberatery avoided, as it always depends on the context of its creation. The problem is looked upon from the opposite standpoint of approach to life as such. Some possible answers to the question why we should be responsible for "non-human" life as well are presented. The author analyses ethical concepts of A. Schweitzer and H. Jonas who consider life in itself, demand on our conscious and responsible actions towards life, and the existence of debt adherent to all our actions as central. The two concepts are applied to a particular field - the problem of unborn life - and they are compared to positions resulting from the definition of human being. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org) |
