| Autor: |
Calcagno, R., Falconieri, S. |
| Přispěvatelé: |
Finance |
| Jazyk: |
angličtina |
| Rok vydání: |
2008 |
| Předmět: |
|
| Zdroj: |
Calcagno, R & Falconieri, S 2008 ' White Knights and the Corporate Governance of Hostile Takeovers ' Tinbergen Discussion Paper, no. 08-118/2, Tinbergen Instituut (TI), Amsterdam . |
| Popis: |
We analyze the dynamics of takeover contests where hostile raiders compete against white knights involved by a lead blockholder of the target firm (the incumbent). We assume that the incumbent has the power to bargain with the potential bidders to set a minimum takeover price. We characterize the conditions under which a white knight wins the takeover contest despite the smaller value of its synergies as compared to those of the hostile bidder. The paper provides a new explanation for the reason why we observe so few hostile takeovers in reality; moreover, it sheds some light on the effectiveness of white knights as an anti-takeover device and the role played by leading minority blockholders in the market for corporate control. |
| Databáze: |
OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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