The incentive core in co-investment problems
| Autor: | Izquierdo Aznar, Josep Maria, Rafels, Carles |
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| Přispěvatelé: | Universitat de Barcelona |
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB Universidad de Barcelona Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya instname |
| Popis: | We study resource-monotonicity properties of core allocations in coinvestment problems: those where a set of agents pool their endowments of a certain resource or input in order to obtain a joint surplus or output that must be allocated among the agents. We analyze whether agents have incentives to raise their initial contribution (resource-monotonicity). We focus not only on looking for potential incentives to agents who raise their contributions, but also in not harming the payoffs to the rest of agents (strong monotonicity property). A necessary and suficient condition to fulfill this property is stated and proved. We also provide a subclass of coinvestment problems for which any core allocation satisfies the aforementioned strong resource-monotonicity property. Moreover, we introduce the subset of core allocations satisfying this condition, namely the incentive core. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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