Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation of Leaders or Bias from Research? A Meta-Regression Analysis

Autor: CAZALS, Antoine, MANDON, Pierre
Přispěvatelé: Centre d'Études et de Recherches sur le Développement International (CERDI), Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I (UdA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Etudes & Documents - Publications, CERDI
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2015
Předmět:
Meta-analysis
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking
Lobbying
Elections
Legislatures
and Voting Behavior
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
JEL: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics/E.E6 - Macroeconomic Policy
Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance
and General Outlook/E.E6.E62 - Fiscal Policy
JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C8 - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology • Computer Programs/C.C8.C82 - Methodology for Collecting
Estimating
and Organizing Macroeconomic Data • Data Access
Political cycles
Budget manipulation
JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H0 - General
[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
Popis: Despite a long history of research on political budget cycles, their existence and magnitudeare still in question. By conducting a systematic analysis of the existing literature we intendto clarify the debate. Based on data collected from over 1,700 regressions and 58 studies, our meta-analysis suggests that leaders do manipulate fiscal tools in order to be re-elected but to an extent that is significantly exaggerated by scholars. However, we show the incumbents' strategy differ depending on which tools they leverage. Finally, we discuss in further details how authors' methodological choices and country institutions affect political budget cycles.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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