Common agency with informed principals
| Autor: | Martimort, David, Moreira, Humberto Ataíde |
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| Přispěvatelé: | Escolas::EPGE, FGV |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2004 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Repositório Institucional do FGV (FGV Repositório Digital) Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) instacron:FGV |
| Popis: | We analyze a common agency game under asymmetric information on the preferences of the non-cooperating principals in a public good context. Asymmetric information introduces incentive compatibility constraints which rationalize the requirement of truthfulness made in the earlier literature on common agency games under complete information. There exists a large class of differentiable equilibria which are ex post inefficient and exhibit free-riding. We then characterize some interim efficient equilibria. Finally, there exists also a unique equilibrium allocation which is robust to random perturbations. This focal equilibrium is characterized for any distribution of types. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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