Strategic inventories under limited commitment

Autor:	Fiocco, Raffaele, Antoniou, Fabio
Přispěvatelé:	Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia
Rok vydání:	2017
Předmět:	Conducta organitzacional Monopolis 338 - Situació econòmica. Política econòmica. Gestió control i planificació de l'economia. Producció. Serveis. Turisme. Preus
Zdroj:	RECERCAT (Dipòsit de la Recerca de Catalunya) Repositori Institucional de la Universitat Rovira i Virgili Universitat Rovira i virgili (URV) Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya instname
Popis:	In a dynamic storable good market where demand changes over time, we investigate the producer's strategic incentives to hold inventories in response to the possibility of buyer stockpiling. The literature on storable goods has demonstrated that buyer stockpiling in anticipation of higher future prices harms the producer's profi tability, particularly when the producer cannot commit to future prices. We show that the producer's inventories act as a strategic device to mitigate the loss from the lack of commitment. Our results provide a rationale for the producer's inventory behavior that sheds new light on the well-documented empirical evidence about inventories. Keywords: buyer stockpiling, commitment, storable goods, strategic inventories. JEL Classifi cation: D21, D42, L12.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::9468851c6fc2aeb7c7a2a4100e8ae427 http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11797/PC3004 Zobrazit plný text záznamu