Trade-offs between justices, economics, and efficiency
| Autor: | Baumgärtner, Stefan, Glotzbach, Stefanie, Hoberg, Nikolai, Quaas, Martin F., Stumpf, Klara Helene |
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| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2011 |
| Předmět: |
Soziale Gerechtigkeit
Sustainability sciences Management & Economics economics Sozialpolitik Opportunitätskosten Wirkungsanalyse Generationenbeziehungen scarce resources scarce ressources normative objectives D61 Gerechtigkeit efficiency ddc:330 intragenerational and intergenerational justice opportunity cost opportunity set D63 A13 Theorie |
| Zdroj: | Baumgärtner, S, Glotzbach, S, Hoberg, N, Quaas, M F & Stumpf, K H 2011 ' Trade-offs between justices, economics, and efficiency ' Working Paper Series in Economics, no. 218, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Lüneburg, Lüneburg . |
| Popis: | We argue that economics – as the scientific method of analyzing trade-offs – canbe helpful (and may even be indispensable) for assessing the trade-off betweenintergenerational and intragenerational justice. Economic analysis can delineate the“opportunity set” of politics with respect to the two normative objectives of inter- andintragenerational justice, i.e. it can describe which outcomes are feasible in achieving thetwo objectives in a given context, and which are not. It can distinguish efficient frominefficient uses of instruments of justice. It can identify the “opportunity cost” of attainingone justice to a higher degree, in terms of less achievement of the other. We find that, undervery general conditions, (1) efficiency in the use of instruments of justice implies that thereis rivalry between the two justices and the opportunity cost of either justice is positive; (2)negative opportunity costs of achieving one justice exist if there is facilitation between thetwo justices, which can only happen if instruments of justice are used inefficiently; (3) inoutcomes of inefficient uses of instruments of justice in the interior of the opportunity set,the two justices are independent of each other and the opportunity cost of either justice iszero. We argue that economics – as the scientific method of analyzing trade-offs – canbe helpful (and may even be indispensable) for assessing the trade-off betweenintergenerational and intragenerational justice. Economic analysis can delineate the “opportunity set” of politics with respect to the two normative objectives of inter- and intragenerational justice, i.e. it can describe which outcomes are feasible in achieving the two objectives in a given context, and which are not. It can distinguish efficient from inefficient uses of instruments of justice. It can identify the “opportunity cost” of attaining one justice to a higher degree, in terms of less achievement of the other. We find that, under very general conditions, (1) efficiency in the use of instruments of justice implies that thereis rivalry between the two justices and the opportunity cost of either justice is positive; (2) negative opportunity costs of achieving one justice exist if there is facilitation between the two justices, which can only happen if instruments of justice are used inefficiently; (3) in outcomes of inefficient uses of instruments of justice in the interior of the opportunity set, the two justices are independent of each other and the opportunity cost of either justice is zero. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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