Cognitive science, representations and dynamical systems theory
| Autor: | Haselager, W.F.G., Bongers, R.M., Rooij, van, I., Tschacher, W., Dauwalder, J.-P. |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Tschacher, W., Dauwalder, J.P., Human Technology Interaction |
| Rok vydání: | 2003 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Tschacher, W.; Dauwalder, J.P. (ed.), The dynamical systems approach to cognition: concepts and empirical paradigms based on self-organization, embodiment, and coordination Dynamics, pp. 229-242 Studies of nonlinear phenomena in life science ; 10, 229-242. River Edge, NJ : World Scientific STARTPAGE=229;ENDPAGE=242;TITLE=Studies of nonlinear phenomena in life science ; 10 The dynamical systems approach to cognition; concepts and empirical paradigms based on self-organisation, embodiment, and coordination dynamics, 229-241 STARTPAGE=229;ENDPAGE=241;TITLE=The dynamical systems approach to cognition; concepts and empirical paradigms based on self-organisation, embodiment, and coordination dynamics |
| Popis: | In this contribution we point out that the assumption of representation in the explanations and models of cognitive science has several disadvantages. We propose that the dynamical systems theory approach, emphasizing the embodied embedded nature of cognition, might provide an important, non-representational alternative. We stress the importance of the challenge, raised by Andy Clark (Clark & Toribio, 1994: Clark, 1997), to dynamical systems theory to deal with ‘representation-hungry’ cognitive tasks. We indicate a possible way to answer that challenge in a empirically applicable manner. We suggest that investigations of this kind strengthen a motto that can be used as an antidote to the traditional representational cravings of cognitive science: ‘Don’t use representations in explanation and modeling unless it is absolutely necessary.’ |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|