Monotone contracts
| Autor: | Bird, Daniel, Frug, Alexander |
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| Přispěvatelé: | Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Repositorio Digital de la UPF Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
| Popis: | A common feature of dynamic interactions is that the environment in which they occur typically changes, perhaps stochastically, over time. We consider a general uctuating contracting environment with symmetric information, and identify a systematic eect of the uctuations in the environment on optimal contracts. We develop a notion of a separable activity that corresponds to a large class of contractual components, and provide a tight condition under which these components manifest a form of seniority: any change that occurs in these components over time, under an optimal contract, favors the agent. We illustrate how our results can be applied in various economic settings. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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