Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets

Autor:	Echenique, Federico, Pereyra, Juan Sebastián
Jazyk:	angličtina
Rok vydání:	2016
Předmět:	unraveling assortative matching jel:C72 jel:D82 jel:D78 Stable matching Gale-Shapley unraveling two-sided matching C72 D82 Gale-Shapley Stable matching Economie ddc:330 strategic complementarities D78
Zdroj:	Theoretical Economics, 11 (1
Popis:	We present a theoretical explanation of inefficient early matching in matching markets. Our explanation is based on strategic complementarities and strategic unraveling. We identify a negative externality imposed on the rest of the market by agents who make early offers. As a consequence, an agent may make an early offer because she is concerned that others are making early offers. Yet other agents make early offers because they are concerned that others worry about early offers, and so on and so forth. The end result is that any given agent is more likely to make an early offer than a late offer. SCOPUS: ar.j FLWOA info:eu-repo/semantics/published
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::6be3453aada6fd3a98905e9bf7df4ab4 https://hdl.handle.net/10419/150270 Zobrazit plný text záznamu