Changing partners in a cheap talk game: Experimental evidence

Autor: Bonroy, Olivier, Garapin, Alexis, Llerena, Daniel
Přispěvatelé: Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble (GAEL), Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology (Grenoble INP)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA), Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology (Grenoble INP )-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019] (UGA [2016-2019]), Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019] (UGA [2016-2019]), Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble ( GAEL ), Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology ( Grenoble INP ) -Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique ( INRA ) -Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( CNRS ) -Université Grenoble Alpes ( UGA ), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique ( INRA ), Université Grenoble Alpes ( UGA ), Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology (Grenoble INP )-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019] (UGA [2016-2019])
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2017
Předmět:
Zdroj: International Journal of Economic Theory
International Journal of Economic Theory, Wiley, 2017, 13 (2), pp.197-216. ⟨10.1111/ijet.12125⟩
International Journal of Economic Theory, Wiley, 2017, 13 (2), pp.197-216. 〈10.1111/ijet.12125〉
ISSN: 1742-7355
1742-7363
DOI: 10.1111/ijet.12125⟩
Popis: This paper considers the effects that the opportunity to change partners has on communication. Our experiment concerns a standard cheap talk game in which a player observes a private forecast before disclosing it (truthfully or untruthfully) in a message that he sends to his partner. Two treatments are applied: in one, each team remains unchanged until the experiment ends; and in the other, players can change their partner. We find that the opportunity to change partners positively affects communication in the relationship. Interestingly, this effect is explained by higher levels of trust in the messages and not by more truthful disclosure of private information.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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