Some Probability Judgments may Rely on Complexity Assessments
| Autor: | Saillenfest, Antoine, Dessalles, Jean-Louis |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Département Informatique et Réseaux (INFRES), Télécom ParisTech, This study is supported by grants from the programme Futur&Ruptures and from the 'Chaire Modélisation des Imaginaires, Innovation et Création'., Noelle, D. C., Dale, R., Warlaumont, A. S., Yoshimi, J., Matlock, T., Jennings, C. D., Maglio, P. P. (Eds.), Saillenfest, Antoine, Noelle, D. C., Dale, R., Warlaumont, A. S., Yoshimi, J., Matlock, T., Jennings, C. D., & Maglio, P. P. (Eds.) |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: |
[INFO.INFO-AI] Computer Science [cs]/Artificial Intelligence [cs.AI]
[SCCO.COMP] Cognitive science/Computer science probability [SCCO.PSYC] Cognitive science/Psychology [SCCO.PSYC]Cognitive science/Psychology Kolmogorov complexity [SCCO.COMP]Cognitive science/Computer science simplicity unexpectedness [INFO.INFO-AI]Computer Science [cs]/Artificial Intelligence [cs.AI] |
| Zdroj: | Proceedings of the 37th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. CogSci 2015 CogSci 2015, Jul 2015, Pasadena, California, United States. pp.2069-2074 |
| Popis: | International audience; Human beings do assess probabilities. Their judgments are however sometimes at odds with probability theory. One possibility is that human cognition is imperfect or flawed in the probability domain, showing biases and errors. Another possibility, that we explore here, is that human probability judgments do not rely on a weak version of probability calculus, but rather on complexity computations. This hypothesis is worth exploring, not only because it predicts some of the probability ‘biases’, but also because it explains human judgments of uncertainty in cases where probability calculus cannot be applied. We designed such a case in which the use of complexity when judging uncertainty is almost transparent. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|