FPGA emulation of laser attacks against secure deep submicron integrated circuits
| Autor: | Papadimitriou, A., Hély, D., Beroulle, V., Maistri, Paolo, Leveugle, Régis |
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| Přispěvatelé: | Techniques de l'Informatique et de la Microélectronique pour l'Architecture des systèmes intégrés (TIMA), Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble 1 (UJF)-Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology (Grenoble INP )-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Laboratoire de Conception et d'Intégration des Systèmes (LCIS), Institut Polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology-Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 (UPMF), Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 (UPMF)-Institut Polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology, Techniques of Informatics and Microelectronics for integrated systems Architecture (TIMA), Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology (Grenoble INP)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Grenoble Alpes (UGA), Torella, Lucie |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2014 |
| Předmět: |
side channel attacks
secure-implementations PACS 8542 [SPI.NANO] Engineering Sciences [physics]/Micro and nanotechnologies/Microelectronics ComputerApplications_COMPUTERSINOTHERSYSTEMS Laser attacks [SPI.NANO]Engineering Sciences [physics]/Micro and nanotechnologies/Microelectronics ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS FPGA |
| Zdroj: | Second Workshop on Trustworthy Manufacturing and Utilization of Secure Devices (TRUDEVICE'14) Second Workshop on Trustworthy Manufacturing and Utilization of Secure Devices (TRUDEVICE'14), May 2014, Paderborn, Germany 7ème Colloque du GdR SoC-SiP 7ème Colloque du GdR SoC-SiP, Jun 2013, Lyon, France |
| Popis: | International audience; Implementation attacks are a major threat to hardware cryptographic implementations. These attacks exploit the correlation existing between the computed data and variables such as computation time, consumed power, and electromagnetic (EM) emissions. Recently, the EM channel has been proven as an effective passive and active attack technique against secure implementations. In this paper, we resume the recent results obtained on this subject, with a particular focus on EM as a fault injection tool. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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