Evolutionary Games for Multiple Access Control: From Egoism to Altruism
| Autor: | Gaiech, Houssem, El-Azouzi, Rachid, Haddad, Majed, Altman, Eitan, Mabrouki, Issam |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Laboratoire Informatique d'Avignon (LIA), Avignon Université (AU)-Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Informatique - CERI, Models for the performance analysis and the control of networks (MAESTRO), Inria Sophia Antipolis - Méditerranée (CRISAM), Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria), École Nationale des Sciences de l'Informatique [Manouba] (ENSI), Université de la Manouba [Tunisie] (UMA), European Project, CERI/LIA - University of Avignon |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2014 |
| Předmět: |
[INFO.INFO-NI]Computer Science [cs]/Networking and Internet Architecture [cs.NI]
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Evolutionary games [INFO.INFO-GT]Computer Science [cs]/Computer Science and Game Theory [cs.GT] [INFO.INFO-IT]Computer Science [cs]/Information Theory [cs.IT] Multiple access control cooperative behavior replicator dynamics [INFO.INFO-AI]Computer Science [cs]/Artificial Intelligence [cs.AI] |
| Zdroj: | 7th International Conference on NETwork Games COntrol and OPtimization (NETGCOOP 2014) 7th International Conference on NETwork Games COntrol and OPtimization (NETGCOOP 2014), Oct 2014, Trento, Italy 7th International Conference on NETwork Games, COntrol and OPtimization (NetGCoop) 7th International Conference on NETwork Games, COntrol and OPtimization (NetGCoop), 2014, Trento, Italy |
| Popis: | International audience; This paper studies multiple access games within a large population of mobiles decomposed into several groups. Mobiles interfere with each other through many local interactions. We assume that each mobile (or player) cooperates with its group by taking into account the performance of its group. We parameterize the degree of cooperation which allows to cover the fully non-cooperative behavior, the fully cooperative behavior, and even more, the fully altruistic behavior, all these as special cases of this parameters choice. In this context, we model and study such cases using the theory of evolutionary games which extend to cover this kind of behavior. We define and characterize the equilibrium (called Evolutionary Stable Strategy) for these games and establish the optimal level of cooperation that maximizes the probability of successful transmission and present some optimization issues. We also study the game dynamics both in its classical form and in presence of delays. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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