Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues
| Autor: | Diamantoudi, Effrosyni, Macho Stadler, Inés, Pérez-Castrillo, David, Xue, Licun, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica, Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica |
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| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya instname Recercat: Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Popis: | We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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