Asymetric price-benefit auctions
| Autor: | Frutos, María Ángeles de |
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| Přispěvatelé: | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía |
| Rok vydání: | 1997 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid instname |
| Popis: | This paper studies the performance of three different auction procedures for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership when the partners have valuations for the assets that are independent but asymmetrically distributed, wirh one partner reputed to be more interested in the assets to be divided. 1 provide results on existence, and uniqueness of the equilibrium induced by these auctions. 1 also show sorne propertiers of these equilibria, in particular tilat witil positive probability tile ex post outcome is inefficient. The results contrast wiril tilose for tile case of symmetric distributions. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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