Side-channel Analysis of Gr{\o}stl and Skein
| Autor: | Boura, Christina, Lévêque, Sylvain, Vigilant, David |
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| Přispěvatelé: | Security, Cryptology and Transmissions (SECRET), Inria Paris-Rocquencourt, Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria), Gemalto [Meudon], GEMALTO (GEMALTO) |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2012 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | IEEE CS Security and Privacy Workshops-SPW 2012 IEEE CS Security and Privacy Workshops-SPW 2012, May 2012, San Francisco, United States. pp.16-26 |
| Popis: | International audience; In this work, a detailed study of two finalists of the SHA-3 competition from the side-channel analysis point of view is provided. For both functions when used as a MAC, this paper presents detected strategies for performing a power analysis. Besides the classical HMAC mode, two additionally proposed constructions, the envelope MAC for Grøstl and the Skein-MAC for Skein are analyzed. Consequently, examples of software countermeasures thwarting first-order DPA or CPA are given. For the validation of our choices, HMAC-Grøstl, HMAC-Skein as well as the countermeasures were implemented on a 32-bit ARM-based smart card, and power analysis attacks were mounted in practice on both unprotected and protected implementations. Finally, the performance difference between both versions is discussed. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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