| Autor: |
Vyrastekova, J., Onderstal, S., Koning, P. |
| Přispěvatelé: |
Markets & Organizations (ASE, FEB), Experimental and Political Economics / CREED (ASE, FEB) |
| Jazyk: |
angličtina |
| Rok vydání: |
2010 |
| Předmět: |
|
| Popis: |
We examine how self-selection of workers into firms depends on the power of the firms' incentive schemes and how it affects the perfor- mance of firms that increase the power of the incentive schemes. In a laboratory experiment, we let subjects choose between (low-powered) team incentives and (high-powered) individual incentives. We observe that subjects exhibiting high trust or reciprocity in the trust game are more likely to choose team incentives. When exposed to individual in- centives, workers who chose team incentives perform worse if both the unobservable interdependency between workers and their incentive to cooperate under team incentives are high. |
| Databáze: |
OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
