Vertical fiscal externalities and the environment
| Autor: | Böhringer, Christoph, Rivers, Nicholas, Yonezawa, Hidemichi |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Sensitivitätsanalyse
Q40 Q54 Ökosteuer Szenariotechnik climate policy Allgemeines Gleichgewicht Externer Effekt Fiscal externality Climate policy Federalism Computable general equilibrium Natural resources energy and environment computable general equilibrium Kanada federalism ddc:330 C68 fiscal externality ddc:333.7 Umweltpolitik Dekompositionsverfahren H77 Finanzbeziehungen H70 |
| Zdroj: | Economics Working Paper Series, 16/234 |
| Popis: | We show that imposition of a state-level environmental tax in a federation crowds out pre-existing federal taxes. We explain how this vertical fiscal externality can lead unilateral state-level environmental policy to generate a welfare gain in the implementing state, at the expense of other states, even absent any environmental benefits. Using a computable general equilibrium model of the Canadian federation, we show that vertical fiscal externalities can be the major determinant of the welfare change following environmental policy implementation by a state government. Our numerical simulations indicate that - as a consequence of vertical fiscal externalities - state governments can reduce greenhouse gas emissions by over 20 percent without any net cost to themselves. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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