| Autor: |
Elfakir, Adil, Lamrani Alaoui, Youssef, Tkiouat, Mohamed, Amer, Zaid |
| Jazyk: |
angličtina |
| Rok vydání: |
2020 |
| Předmět: |
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| Popis: |
In profit and loss sharing contracts, profits are shared according to a specific\ud ratio while losses are shared according to each partner contribution ration in the\ud project’s capital. We aim to reduce entrepreneurial effort shirking in a profit and\ud loss sharing contract involving a VC and an entrepreneur. We use a game theoretic approach and try to find the profit-sharing ratio that would reduce the moral\ud hazard risk of effort shirking. The game theoretic approach allows for the development of a profit-sharing ratio span of negotiation that fulfil both the incentive\ud and participative constraints of the PLS participants |
| Databáze: |
OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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