| Popis: |
In his seminal book, Philosophy of Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction, José Luis Bermúdez argues that David Marr's influential distinction between computational, algorithmic, and implementational levels of explanation cannot be used as a general framework for thinking about the levels of explanation in psychology and cognitive science. Bermúdez argues that Marr's tripartite distinction cannot be used for this task because it paradigmatically applies to subpersonal and lower-level modular cognitive processes, while the mind as a whole is characterized by non-modular higher-level cognitive systems. In this paper, I evaluate how plausible Bermúdez' s view is that the mind as a whole cannot be usefully understood from the Marrian perspective. Part of the evaluation will be based on the recent advancements in the active inference framework, suggesting that even non-modular personal processes can be computationally analyzed and algorithmically implemented. In this regard, I will argue that, under the active inference conception of the mind, Marr's distinction might indeed serve as a framework for understanding the different levels of explanation at which the mind and its processes can be analyzed. |
