Abstrakt: |
In The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism(1949), Nishitani Keiji provides a thoroughgoing questioning of the theme of nihilism in Japan. Yet, while the text contains a sharp and penetrating interpretation of Heidegger, it focuses on the early Heidegger, whose thinking had not yet ventured into the theme of nihilism. The relationship between Heidegger and Nishitani thus contains a certain “gap” that needs to be investigated. This study takes a cue from the appendix to the The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, “Nihilism and Existence in Nietzsche,” in order to clarify the differences between Heidegger and Nishitani vis-à-vis Nietzsche’s nihilism. Through this process, we will come to know the difference in their positions on who is the “subject (主体)” of nihilism in terms of their interpretations of a constellation of Nietzsche’s key terms, such as “will to power,” “the eternal return of the same,” the “overman,” “amor fati,” and so forth. From there, we will further identify some of the issues involved in their particular understandings of nihilism, and present a perspective on “contemporary nihilism.” I argue that central to their differences is the status of “morals” in nihilism. |