Comment on Kwong-loi Shun, ‘Anger, Compassion, and the Distinction between First and Third Person’
| Autor: | Jay Wallace, R. |
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| Zdroj: | Australasian Philosophical Review; October 2021, Vol. 5 Issue: 4 p374-382, 9p |
| Abstrakt: | ABSTRACTA critical discussion of Kwong-loi Shun’s account of anger as a response to situations rather than agents. The paper draws on a relational interpretation of the moral domain to argue that it makes a normative difference to one’s moral emotions whether one was the immediate victim of wrongful conduct, or merely a third-party observer of such conduct. Those who have been wronged by immoral actions have warrant for a kind of angry resentment that does not carry over to third parties. The paper also questions whether negative emotions are fully intelligible as forms of anger if they are not states that put one in opposition to specific agents rather than responses to unfortunate situations. |
| Databáze: | Supplemental Index |
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