Examining dissimilar interactions enabling late, underpayments and non-payments to construction contractors

Autor: Kenyatta, Mark Obegi, Gwaya, Abednego Oswald, Munguti Masu, Sylvester, Ajwang, Patrick
Zdroj: Journal of Strategic Contracting and Negotiation; 20220101, Issue: Preprints
Abstrakt: Previous research linked late, underpaid, and non-paid contractors to various performance issues. However, the degree to which these differences in practices enable the problem under design-bid-build contracting is unknown. To address this gap, expert interviews were used to rate 11 incompatible practices. One-mode matrices were computed by utilizing social network analysis methods. Using metrics like structural equivalence and Euclidean distance, the study established that different indexes have different connections to the payment problem. The most significant index suggests the issue is a low-cost acquisition strategy. The strategy's misaligned interests were also corroborated by the hierarchical clustering and block modelling results. The study contributes to the methodology of assessing the efficacy of existing payment default remedies, rationalization of intermediary roles, and illustrates deviations from the general contracting principles.
Databáze: Supplemental Index