| Abstrakt: |
It has been recently claimed that explainability should be added as a fifth principle to AI ethics, supplementing the four principles that are usually accepted in Bioethics: Autonomy, Beneficence, Nonmaleficence and Justice. We propose here that with regard to AI, on the one hand explainability is indeed a new dimension of ethical concern that should be paid attention to, while on the other hand, explainability in itself should not necessarily be considered an ethical “principle”. We think of explainability rather (i) as an epistemic requirement for taking into account ethical principles, but not as an ethical principle in itself; (ii) as an ethical demand that can be derived from ethical principles. We do agree that explainability is a key demand in AI Ethics, with practical importance for stakeholders to take into account; but we argue that it should not be considered as a fifth ethical principle, to maintain a philosophical consistency in the organization of AI ethical principles. |
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