| Autor: |
Alhussayen, Hanan, Shabou, Ridha, Medhioub, Imed, Samontaray, Durga Prasad |
| Zdroj: |
International Journal of Business Innovation and Research; 2020, Vol. 23 Issue: 2 p205-249, 45p |
| Abstrakt: |
The ownership structure can strengthen or weaken the monitoring functions of the board. Therefore, it is intended in this article to analyse how the complexity of the ownership structure affects the relationship between intensive board monitoring and firm value. The study covers all the firms listed in the Saudi stock market, except the firms listed in the banking and insurance sectors, over the period 2008 till 2013. The results of the analysis reveal that the direct ownership of large shareholders in non-complex structures and the joint ownership between the government and family owners and individual investors both complement the monitoring functions of the board. Further the indirect ownership of ultimate owners in complex structures weakens the board monitoring intensity. |
| Databáze: |
Supplemental Index |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
