| Abstrakt: |
The meta-problem of consciousness, according to David Chalmers, is (roughly) the problem of explaining why we think there is a problem of consciousness. In his paper, titled 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness', published last year in this journal, David Chalmers did a great service to the field of consciousness studies by laying down a framework for dealing with the meta-problem and with its consequences in a way that cuts across the traditional theoretical divisions on the topic of consciousness. This collection â–” of which this volume constitutes the first part, the publication of the second part being planned for May 2020 â–” is devoted to discussing Chalmers' approach to the meta-problem. It features a series of response pieces targeting Chalmers' article written by philosophers and scientists, as well as a response to commentators by Chalmers (which will feature in the second of the special issues). I am very happy to be editing this collection, which I think is likely to bring together new ideas (or new versions of old ideas) in order to help us make progress in the study of consciousness. In this editorial introduction, I will provide an overview of Chalmers' meta-problem paper as well as the contributions featuring in this first volume. |
