| Autor: |
Lindskold, Svenn, Horai, Joann |
| Zdroj: |
Psychological Reports; April 1974, Vol. 34 Issue: 2 p623-629, 7p |
| Abstrakt: |
40 preadolescents played a modified Prisoner's Dilemma game in which they were given opportunities to communicate either promises of their own cooperation or threats of a fine if the target did not cooperate. A simulated target replied either honestly or evasively while being two-thirds cooperative on the message-relevant trials. The results supported an extension of the Osgood proposal and clarified previous research. As hypothesized, Ss in the honest-replies condition sent more messages, were more cooperative on threat-relevant trials, and made greater use of the promise message than did the evasive-replies Ss. |
| Databáze: |
Supplemental Index |
| Externí odkaz: |
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