| Abstrakt: |
This study has identified that little research has been done related to the legal framework for multilateral verification. The drafters of the NPT intended to limit the scope of the Articles I and II - this intention has been confirmed through consecutive events, in particular the extension of the non-proliferation regime. Considerations of the current legislative basis have, however, brought two aspects to the attention: a) existing guiding language and practices, and b) the lack of such for most cases and types of actors. In the case of the IAEA, the broad and detailed legal basis makes its participation definitely more complicated than for example Norway in the UK-Norway initiative, an effort also discussed in this paper. This conclusion suggests that a well-founded and well-defined cooperation between governments in good standing with respect to the non-proliferation regime may add important contributions to the development of multilateral disarmament verification regime in its exploratory stages. While the Trilateral initiative added significant contributions to the principal understanding of the legal basis for the participation of the IAEA in disarmament verification, the lack of transparency with respect to its legal framework and Model Protocol hamper the overall understanding of how to proceed in this effort. As the practical efforts to address the technical aspect of multilateral disarmament advance, an initiative should be taken to publish the results of also the legal results of the Trilateral initiative, which may pave the way for new initiatives in this work, in conjunction with the political and technical efforts currently being carried out. Given the cases described in this paper and the recent experiences related to verification of weapons of mass destruction, an effort to develop the legal, as well as the political and the technical, aspects of disarmament verification seems well justified. A relevant future case is to disarm North-Korea, a task which may very well involve NNWS, for example South-Korea, and the IAEA, given its long history from verifying the safeguards agreement no longer in place, and the results of the negotiations between the international community and North-Korea at various stages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
