| Abstrakt: |
The application of "safeguards by design" (SBD) to the design process of the ACR-1000 reactor is described. Understanding and accommodating safeguards in the design process requires a set of "design requirements"; however, such requirements must exist alongside other more traditional design requirements based on compliance and operational goals. A "Design Guide" for safeguards was therefore created, consisting of recommendations based on best practices. To acquire an understanding of safeguards requirements at the design level, a systematic accounting of diversion pathways was required. The GenIV International Forum (GIF) Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PRPP) methodology (Rev.5, 2006) was chosen for this exercise. Since the process was intended to assess the need for safeguards, two of the measures, Detection Efficiency and Detection Probability, were overlooked as they pertain to the effect of implemented safeguards. In addition, the Material Type measure was not required since the high technical capability of the host state precludes any considerations this would otherwise raise. The pathway comparison consisted of a simplified qualitative ranking (high, medium, low attractiveness) based on expert judgement. Results of this exercise were used stimulate discussions involving the design team, the SSAC, and the IAEA, and propose steps that accommodate safeguards without negatively impacting other design requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
