| Autor: |
Apikyan, Samuel, Diamond, David, Way, Ralph, Gabaraev, B. A., Cherepnin, Yu. S. |
| Zdroj: |
Prevention, Detection & Response to Nuclear & Radiological Threats; 2008, p57-64, 8p |
| Abstrakt: |
Safeguarding of nuclear technologies, facilities and materials against unauthorised application and proliferation is very much on the agenda at present. The attention given to this issue is due not only to the increasing threat of terrorism but to the nuclear power renaissance as well. Many countries have declared the national energy strategies that give a prominent role to nuclear energy sources. The principal risks of the nuclear power are associated with the enrichment (separation) of uranium isotopes, long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel, plutonium and/or uranium recovery from SNF, storage of recovered fissile materials. The degree of proliferation resistance results in particular from a combination of technical design features, operational modalities, institutional arrangements, and safeguards measures. These can be classified into two groups-intrinsic proliferation resistance features and extrinsic measures. The term ‘intrinsicfeatures' implies technical features. Currently, two basic principles provide a high-level guidance regarding innovative nuclear energy systems. Proliferation resistance features and measures shall be implemented throughout the full life cycle for innovative nuclear energy systems to help ensure that INSs will continue to be an unattractive means to acquire fissile material for a nuclear weapons programme. Both intrinsic features and extrinsic measures are essential, and neither shall be considered sufficient by itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Supplemental Index |
| Externí odkaz: |
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