| Abstrakt: |
Theatre is often seen as something which makes an important contribution in working for social change -- nowhere more so than in South Africa. This article analyses the different ways in which theatre can play such an ethical role, specifically when ethics is interpreted from a poststructural perspective. In this paradigm ethics moves beyond a definition of 'right and wrong', towards the search for a non-violent relation with the Other. If theatre can bring about change, is it an ethical process, and if not, why do we value this form of social change? According to both Mamet and Gadamer, theatre confronts the spectator with a form of meaning that transcends their system of reality, and thus can achieve change in their thought patterns. The meaning created in the theatre is traditionally communicated via a network of relations of domination. Since domination implies violence, it is unethical. Even though poststructuralism freed meaning from being the exclusive creation of either the author or the spectator, it is clear that an absolute escape from theatre conventions as power relations is impossible. Violence is equally implied in the mere act of representation. Levinas equates representation with cognition: the ethical relation exists in the moment preceding cognition, but is neutralised as soon as the Other's infinity exceeds its representation, its 'frame'. This is the ethical paradox of theatre: in an effort to change narrow thought patterns, to reduce stereotypes, theatre must work with identity and representation -- tools that are by definition unethical. The 'Theatre of the Absurd' and Brecht's Verfremdungstechnik are critically discussed as efforts to escape the necessity of using reductive frames in characterisation. In response to the two problems the article argues firstly that 'dialogue' -- as opposed to rhetoric -- should dominate theatre. Here the work of Jacques Derrida becomes relevant. He deconstructs the representation-reality hierarchy by showing that theatre does not reflect life; rather life is a reflection of the transcendental principle which the theatre communicates. For this reason classical theatre's pursuit to represent life will always fail. In addition, he visualizes a conversational relation between the stage and the audience, with the message communicated, always a mere possibility rather than a necessity. In practice this means that the theatre should cease to be a theological space dominated by speech. Similarly, Artaud wants to see a physical language on stage that transcends the spoken word and the metaphysics of presence -- and thus creates an opening for the Other to slip inside. This language can communicate a positive conception of metaphysics, because it becomes an incantation, rather than a tool to communicate closed meaning. The emotional response of the audience becomes more important than the intellectual response. The presence of the body implied by Artaud's physical language is discussed in relation to the work of, amongst others, Bakhtin. Here the subject is constituted through his or her body by the look of the Other; an actor is equally constituted through the look of the audience. Bakhtin realizes that this relationship is still bridged by representation -- as an alternative he introduces the idea of the carnival, where there is no difference between audience and actor. The article offers a different escape from the impasse of representation: Derrida's concept of closure, "the double refusal both of remaining within the limits of the tradition and of the possibility of transgressing that limit". This double activity is discussed in relation to a production of Aars! and offers the possibility of regaining the ethical moment in theatre. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
